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THE INCENTIVES FOR CONTRIBUTING DIGITAL CONTENTS
OVER P2P NETWORKS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
TUSHAR K. NANDI AND FABRICE ROCHELANDET
Abstract. In this paper, we examine the determinants of sharing behaviour
by envisaging two types of behaviour, namely contribution against free rid-
ing. In doing so, we evaluate the theoretical predictions about reciprocity and
altruism in the presence of non-rival goods and anonymity. We use a probit
model and primary data from a survey that collects information about P2P
sharing behaviour of more than 2000 individuals. Our econometric results sug-
gest that the motivations for contributing are poorly determined by rational
self-interested behaviour. We then envisage policy implications in terms of
copyright enforcement and business.
1. Introduction
There are at least two major reasons for analyzing behavior on P2P networks:
designing new business models based on this transfer protocol and fighting against
unauthorized file-sharing of copyrighted works in P2P networks. In both cases, it
is crucial to understand why people actually contribute resources for the benefit of
other participants. In the first case, inspiring users to contribute more resources
could enable promoters of P2P solutions to support the development of the network
and enhance its performance. In the second case, governments and copyright owners
might seek to lead people to contribute less and less digital contents until the P2P
sharing networks eventually dissappear for lack of utility.
Our paper aims to evaluate the theoretical predictions about reciprocity and
free-riding in the presence of non-rival goods and anonymity. If, on one hand,
motivations for downloading are quite well explored by empirical studies, on the
other hand, there is much less written about why people actually contribute. In
short, why do individuals keep on contributing to the commons in the presence of
massive free-riding and when this behaviour proves costly for them?
We investigate empirical regularities on the illegal P2P sharing of copyrighted
contents. The originality of our study is that we use data that contains information
about the level of individual contribution from a large heterogeneous sample. We
are able to link this behaviour to the characteristics of individuals: demographics,
internet skills and perceptions towards cultural diversity, legal and technical risk,
ethical concerns, and the value of P2P networks. Our study then identifies the
diﬀerential impact of the determinants of contribution against free-riding that are
deemed to be crucial for the persistence of P2P networks.
We thank the members of our research team ADIS (www.adislab.net) - in particular, Didier
Lebert — as well as the participants of the 2008 SERCI Congress for helpful discussions. This work
was supported by the French National Agency of Research, research program ANR-05-JCJC-0204-
01.
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The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. The next section provides
a brief survey of the literature that seeks to explain the sharing behaviour and
highlight the determinants of contribution behaviour over P2P networks. The third
section presents the variables and econometric model. Section four presents the
main results. Section five concludes and envisages some policy implications.
2. Literature review
2.0.1. The nature of contribution. When investigating P2P sharing networks, re-
searchers mainly focus on downloading behaviour. They generally address two main
questions: the actual impact of downloading on sales (for instance, Oberholzer and
Strumpf, 2007, Liebowitz, 2006) and the motivations for downloading (Holm, 2003,
Rochelandet and Le Guel, 2005). Surprisingly, few empirical papers1 examine the
opposite behaviour, contribution, although it also proves crucial to the very exis-
tence of P2P networks.
Most of the research in this area attempts to explain either free-riding or coop-
eration on the basis of some theoretical predictions. In particular, they envisage
the theoretical conditions for sustainability of P2P networks. In other words, they
ask why self-interested members of such communities keep on contributing despite
high levels of free-riding. A prominent approach in this literature has been to apply
game-theoretic frameworks to analyse the stability of cooperative behaviour when
agents with unlimited capacity of calculation and foresight are concerned only about
their own interests.2
This paper, rather, explores the motivations for contributing contents. Notions
such as altruism, reciprocity and other-regarding self-interest can be used to explain
this behaviour. In particular, two approaches can be mobilized. A first approach
is the utilitarian perspective by considering that individuals try to solve a trade-oﬀ
between the utility derived from contributing and associated costs of sharing their
contents. Another perspective is the social psychology that explores the influence
of social environment and norms: How do individuals acquire norms of behaviour
and how this process of acquisition will in turn influence their behaviour? To what
extent does their acceptance of specific social/private norms, beliefs, social status,
mimetic propensity, and social pressure influence their behaviour?3
In this paper, we adopt a utilitarian approach. We consider contributions of
digital contents over P2P networks as resulting from rational (hedonic) decision.
Contributors are considered to derive some satisfaction and incur costs when par-
ticipating in P2P networks. We explore to what extent such a general proposition is
relevant. This approach seems particularly interesting to investigate since current
copyright enforcement is grounded on the argument that individuals might react
positively to legal sanction. In particular, the legal measures against file-swappers
mainly target those who contribute by uploading copyrighted contents.4 We then
examine the underlying assumption of regulators according to which P2P users
make some trade-oﬀ.
1See Ripeanu et al. (2007).
2See Ranganathan et al. (2003), Krishnan et al. (2004), Dang Nguyen and Pénard (2007), and
Xia et al. (2007).
3See for instance Strahilevitz (2003) and Shang et al. (2008).
4See the recent bill (‘réponse graduée’) of French government to fight against P2P networks.
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Empirical studies suggest the predominance of free-riding over P2P networks
without specific technical design to limit it (Adar and Huberman, 2000, Feldman et
al., 2003, Asvanund et al., 2004). P2P sharing networks are ‘loose-knit’ communities
characterized by civil anonymity, lack of social ties between users before joining the
networks, and little discussion between them. Moreover, most of P2P networks
are a non-excludable good. Each user can benefit from shared contents without
contributing to the common-pool. Nobody is compelled to feed the networks with
contents and enhance the diversity of supply. Thus, providing files can be analysed
as a private provision of public good.
Consequently, P2P networks are potential candidates for the tragedy of the com-
mons. Free-riding is likely to prevail and threaten the whole utility of P2P services
by drying up the commons.5 Users of P2P networks are more likely to be free-riders
since they can benefit from the service without risk (or with small risk) of retalia-
tion from contributors of new contents. Consequently, any rational self-interested
user in the neoclassical perspective will tend to free-ride more since the cost of
contribution is perceived as being positive. The dominant strategy could lead to
an equilibrium in which the size of the network is zero.
However, in spite of such a massive free-riding, some users keep on contributing
enough for P2P networks to expand. The question then is to explain why do
P2P communities thrive? Of course, free-riding can be hindered by its own costs.
For instance, circumventing the ‘by-default’ sharing option of P2P software can
be costly in terms of time and skills (Golle et al., 2001).6 But, even though P2P
contributors perceive a high cost of free-riding, this does not explain why they
actually contribute contents instead of giving up the network. From a self-interest
standpoint, rational users will contribute (and not free-ride) if their net gain of
contribution is positive and higher than the payoﬀ resulting from free-riding.
2.1. The gain from contributing. In this paper, we define contribution as the
act of feeding a P2P network with new contents. By contrast to technical sharing,
ripping a CD and a DVD, taking it from one folder of the hard-disk to a P2P shared
folder is not compelled by P2P software. Individuals can simply let their computers
contribute to the eﬃciency of the P2P sharing network without, in fact, contributing
new titles and hence enhancing the diversity of the P2P shared resource. In this
case, they actually share common resources but they do not renew the commons
by feeding new titles. In short, if everybody free rides in such a way (without
contributing new titles), then the value of the P2P networks will tend to zero for
5Note that, by contrast to the whole literature on this subject, free-riding can be considered
as a key element of the attractiveness and reputation of sharing network. Free-riding generates
a positive externality by attracting more participants and hence more contributors. Conversely,
the disappearance of free-riders due to strong extrinsic motivations (individual rating, exclusion
if not contributing. . . ) can reduce the size of the network below the sustainable level in terms of
reputation and diversity of titles!
6P2P architecture can design each user as a contributor and accordingly, every downloaded
file is automatically shared with other peers connected to the network. Thus, free-riding requires
a technical manipulation (copying the files from the shared directory, shutting down the sharing
option) that can be a disincentive for non-contribution. Nonetheless, this opting-out is quite easy
to achieve and may represent a non-significant cost for skilled users of P2P networks. And if these
skilled users perceive a positive cost of contribution, they are very likely to opt-out.
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the installed base of users who will no longer find anything new.7 Consequently,
this paper considers pure free-riding as feeding no new contents.
Let the net gain of contribution be denoted by vi = ui−ci where ui is the utility
derived from contributing and ci is the cost of contribution. A user will be willing
to contribute if she derives a positive vi that is also higher than the gain from
free-riding. So it becomes important to understand the determinants of ui and ci.
P2P users can incur costs through the perceived risks of being caught (Bhat-
tacharjee et al., 2006)) and of being infected by virus or spyware. Also, they can
suﬀer from download speed congestion when uploading contents (Feldman et al.,
2003).8 Finally, contribution requires adequate skills and time to digitalize contents
as well as resources to store the sharing files. For instance, contributing movies re-
quires time and skills associated with finding files or ripping DVD/CDs.9
As for the utility of contribution, we can first express it by ui = ui(xi, G) (‘pure
altruism’, Andreoni, 1990) where xi is the consumption of a composite good and
G is the total amount of ‘resources’ available on the P2P network. G captures the
number of available contents. Here, we suppose that contributing is motivated by
the increase in the utility derived from the increase in G. So the level of contri-
bution will depend on the perception of the impact of one’s own contribution on
the total value of the P2P network. For instance, contribution can be motivated
by expectation for a generalized or sequential reciprocity: individual A anticipates
that her contribution will entail contribution from B that will in turn lead C to
contribute and so on. An individual, then, will have no incentive to contribute if he
anticipates that this increase in G will occur with or without her own contribution
(crowding out eﬀect).10
Another way is to consider the individual contribution gi (similar to the economic
analysis of donations and bequests) so that it directly enters the utility function;
ui = ui(xi, gi). Gu and Jarvenpaa (2003) test this ‘warm glow’ eﬀect (‘impure
altruism’, Andreoni, 1990) according to which an individual can get a private benefit
derived from the social recognition and demonstration eﬀects of her contribution.
However, in contrast to other sharing communities, the actual contributions in the
P2P networks are rarely public information making it diﬃcult to conceive as a
repeated game. Even when using a pseudonym, most of the participants of a P2P
network tend to change their virtual identity for legal concern. In this respect, the
rating experimentation of Kazaa was far from being conclusive.
7The questions we asked in the survey administered in 2005 are explicit regarding this question:
“How frequently do you contribute new titles on P2P networks?”
8Concerning this last cost, it can be minimized by a traﬃc redistribution eﬀect designed to
favour the sharing peers. Introducing this opportunity cost for non-sharers would act as a direct
incentive to contribute (Krishnan et al. 2004). However, in a four-period game Jian and MacKie-
Mason (2006) suggest that such an ‘oﬄoad eﬀect’ might be insuﬃcient to lead to a suﬃcient level
of sharing because the inherent benefits decrease in the size of the network of sharers. They show
that, in a network with k sharing nodes, a user, who decides to share her content, increases the
probability of getting one unit of content by only 3,3%. Their findings confirm the more general
result in public economics based on the logic of collective action of Olson (1965).
9Ethical concerns associated with contribution can be also considered as a psychological cost
that can reduce the gain associated with contribution and decreasing the likelihood for a P2P user
to be a contributor. However, we suppose that this factor is a social norm adopted by individuals
that constrains their behaviour without any calculation (see also Shang et al., 2008).
10Individuals choose the level of their contributions only if their contributions impact the
aggregate levels of contribution and so the provision of public good (Bernheim, 1986).
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In the absence of private benefit from sharing, Jian and MacKie-Mason (2006)
apply the notion of generalized reciprocity (Mead, 1934) to explain why some users
actually contribute to the P2P networks.11 P2P networks are computer-mediated
communities whose members are interconnected and plan to participate without
precise term. In this peculiar context, contributions are motivated by the expecta-
tion of contributions from the set of other participants (the sharing community).
Voluntary contributions to non-excludable public goods are often favoured by the
knowledge that the other participants and beneficiaries also do their fair share. Jian
and MacKie-Mason (2006) then show analytically how generalized reciprocity can
sustain P2P networks with equilibrium free-riding.
Finally, users can have a pure taste for contributing. Altruism can be captured
in this approach by taking into account the utility of peers in the utility function
of a participant. In this case, ui = ui(xi, uj) where uj is the utility of some
other participant j and ∂ui∂uj ≥ 0. Individuals are motivated to cooperate because
they take pleasure in others’ pleasure.12 More precisely, contributors derive utility
from meeting the needs of the recipients. Their objective can also be to influence
the nature of the supply available by providing the works they like very much or
by contributing rare titles (bootlegs) they want to be known. They simply take
pleasure in sharing the works they have enjoyed. They can also believe that the
preferences of some peers are the same as their own.
Some limitations to this last explanation can be mentioned. Altruism generally
is based on the information about the nature and the level of needs. In the case
of P2P communities, Strahilevitz (2003) notes that a file-sharer does not know
the social identity of the (potential) recipients. Another problem is to determine
the boundaries for the level of contribution with such a specification. Moreover,
contribution is simply explained by its eﬀect (Dawes and Thaler, 1988) and not by
the very reasons that lead to this result. Why do people incorporate the utility of
others in their own utility function? In the case of P2P contribution, social norms
can be incorporated in the preferences of individuals.
Finally, from an empirical standpoint, all those factors often operate simulta-
neously (ui = ui(xi, G, gi, uj) ) because each argument can impact the others and
consequently, their relative eﬀect proves diﬃcult to distinguish. In other words,
their modes of interaction are diﬃcult to distinguish not only because of the limita-
tion of directed survey but also because individuals themselves can have diﬃculties
to make a conscious trade-oﬀ between their private interest and the general good.
3. Econometric framework
3.1. Variables and Hypotheses. Our model identifies and analyses the deter-
minants of the contribution to a P2P sharing network. Since a random sampling
11They summarize their idea by quoting Putnam (2000): “I’ll do this for you without expecting
anything specific back from you, in the confident expectation that someone else will do something
for me down the road.”
12Conversely, the knowledge of the misfortune of others decreases one’s pleasure. It corresponds
to the concept of ‘sympathy’ defined by Sen (1977) as a motivation for self-interested behaviour
since acting in this case increases the conditions of the person who acts. Sen distinguishes this
concept from the altruist behaviour of ‘commitment’ when someone morally acts to improve the
condition of others without seeking to enhance her own condition.
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design is used for data collection, the survey collects information from both non-
participants and participants of P2P network. The sample can be divided into two
broad groups: P2P participants and non-participants. The former group can be
further divided into two behavioural groups:13
(1) free-riding: A user receives contents without contributing, that is she only
downloads;
(2) Contribution: She always contributes contents, whether or not she receives
anything.14
It is possible to imagine that technological constraints make pure free-riding im-
possible. However, in our study, the major distinction between the two groups is
that the ‘free-rider’ does not add new contents to the network whereas the ‘con-
tributor’ uploads new contents to the network.
According to the literature reviewed in previous section, the main factors that
may explain these diﬀerent behaviours can be grouped into three categories. The
first one evaluates the utilitarian assumptions using four independent variables,
namely the value of the sharing network, the perceived utility from cultural diversity
available on P2P networks, and the cost associated with contribution, and legal and
technical risks. The second group refers to a socio-psychological approach using
two variables: the social neighbourhood and the ethical concerns relating to the
perceived impact of unauthorised P2P sharing on artists and content industries.
The third and last group of variables is made up of demographics and individual
skills.
The first factor (Willingness to pay) represents the sum that the individual would
accept to pay to have an unlimited access to music contents through a P2P net-
work. It is expected that this variable is positively correlated with being reciprocal
or altruistic over P2P network. The underlying hypothesis is that the more individ-
uals value a sharing network, the more they derive utility from its existence (and
persistence), and then the more they may contribute to feed it.
Similarly, the second variable (Cultural diversity) evaluates the value of the shar-
ing network for each participant in terms of diversity of titles. If she considers it as
crucial, she is more likely to contribute by feeding the P2P network with new titles.
This binary variable equals one if the respondent considers that there is not enough
cultural diversity associated with oﬄine or online music sellers in comparison with
P2P networks, and zero otherwise.
The third variable (Legal risk) refers to the perceived risks associated with unau-
thorised sharing, namely the perceived likelihood of being caught and sanctioned.
It is assumed to impact negatively on the contribution to a P2P network.15 The
underlying assumption is that the greater the perceived legal risk of using P2P file-
sharing networks, the greater is the perceived cost associated with contributing,
and then the smaller is the net gain (or the greater the net loss) of sharing for
13Our statistical taxonomy does not exactly parallel the precise concepts of ‘reciprocity’ — that
generally refers to gift exchange and labour market decisions — and ‘altruism’ — that has been
mainly invoked to explain contributions to charities and intergenerational transfers.
14According to the above-mentioned literature, the contribution behaviour can be explained
by purely altruistic motivations or by reciprocity.
15Respondents chose between four perceived ordered levels of risk: “no risk”, “low risk”,
“medium risk” and “high risk”. One key fact to be noted is that a wide campaign against copying
was carried out shortly before we began our survey. So it is likely that respondents were quite
aware of the risks associated with illegal sharing.
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individuals. Legal risk is assumed to be perceived as higher with contributing than
with receiving contents because this generally constitutes the act that gives rise to
copyright lawsuits.16
The fourth variable (Technical risk) is similar to the previous one. The computer
risk associated with sharing digital contents corresponds to the perceived likelihood
of being infected by virus or spyware. Similar to legal risk, the greater the technical
risk, the greater is the perceived cost associated with contributing, and then the
smaller is the net gain (or the greater the net loss) of sharing for individuals.
The fifth variable (Herding) accounts for the social norms that can influence
the choice of individuals. It refers to the impact of social interaction on sharing
behaviour on P2P network. The question is to envisage to what extent the number
of copiers in the social neighbourhood of an individual (whom he can observe and/or
with whom he can communicate and share experiences) influences positively his
cooperative behaviour over P2P networks. The underlying assumption is that P2P
users acquire cooperative routines in their direct social networks.
The sixth variable (Ethics) is an index accounting for the ethical concerns of the
individual regarding the copying of copyrighted works. It indicates the psychological
‘costs’ the individuals bear when they feel they are acting against ethics while
copying.17 This variable is usually assumed to impact negatively on all uses of
P2P file-sharing networks.18 Nevertheless, contributors can feel that their sharing
is positive when they consider that they contribute to an increase in the value of
the works they share and hence the reputation of their favourite artists.
The last group of variables represents demographics (age, gender, education,
socio-professional group/occupation, and income) and Internet skills (past expe-
rience in using Internet). The eﬀect of demographic variables could be positive,
negative or zero. Internet skills can have a positve influence on contributing. This
positive eﬀect can be interpreted in the utilitarian perspective. Indeed, computer-
skilled individuals are more likely to know how (or may incur less time) to make
copies from originals thanks to a better knowledge of software enabling them to rip
a DVD and to circumvent DRM protection. So the lower costs they incur would in-
crease the likelihood of them benefitting from a net gain from contribution. Another
way to explain this positive influence can be that Internet-skilled people are more
likely to adhere to the social norms of reciprocity and sharing conveyed through
Internet and then to contribute.
3.2. Estimation strategy. We observe the copying behaviour of individuals who
participate in P2P network in two mutually exclusive behavioural traits — ‘Free-
ride’, and ‘Contribute’. We use a probit model in order to estimate the eﬀect of
the factors mentioned above on the probability of contributing to a P2P network.
16Of course, other factors can contribute to increase the costs of sharing such as the decrease
in the downloading capacity. But our survey did not include questions relating to this specific
technical problem. In addition, we suppose that, in 2005, high-speed Internet already permitted
to overcome such a technical constraint.
17It is built by requesting respondents to scale — between “do not agree”, “partially disagree”,
“agree” and “fully agree” — their ethical concerns through four questions: “According to you,
copying (1) endangers the movie and record markets; (2) aﬀects the income of authors and artists;
(3) does not respect the work of authors and artists; (4) is harmful in itself.” We assign the values
1, 2, 3, 4 for each scaled variable and then add them up to construct the index.
18For a recent contribution, see Shang et al. (2008).
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Since we are interested in explaining contribution behaviour we can use a binary
outcome model. Let yi denote our dependent variable defined as follows
yi =
½
1 if individual i contributes to a P2P network
0 otherwise
Let y∗i denote the latent variable underlying the observed variable yi. Assuming
a single index specification of the latent variable we have
y∗i = Xiβ + ui
where X is a set of explanatory variables including individual characteristics,
the β’s are the parameters to be estimated, and u is a random error. The model
can be presented as
yi =
½
1 if y∗i = Xiβ + ui ≥ 0
0 otherwise
For the probit model u is assumed to be normally distributed. Hence the choice
probability is given by
Pr(yi = 1 |X ) = Φ(Xiβ)
where Φ(·) stands for the standard normal distribution. The estimates of the
parameters β are obtained by maximizing the log likelihood function given as
LL(β) =
nX
i=1
yi ln[Φ(Xiβ)] + (1− yi) ln[1−Φ(Xiβ)]
Often interest lies in determining the marginal eﬀect of the independent variables.
The marginal eﬀect of a variable is calculated as follows
∂ Pr(yi = 1 |X )
∂xij
= φ(Xiβj)βj
where φ stands for standard normal density function.
4. Data and results
4.1. Sample. We base our analysis on primary data regarding individual sharing
behaviour in P2P collected by a survey in January and February of the year 2005.
The survey collected information from 2533 individuals using both a pen and paper
survey and aWeb-based survey. To simplify missing data correction, we chose to use
the list-wise deletion approach (Allison, 2001). The sample bias due to the Web-
based survey has been corrected using a post-stratification method implemented
with an SAS software macro named CALMAR and developed by the French Na-
tional Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). There is considerable
variation in the data in terms of socio-demographics and sharing behaviour in P2P
networks.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and distribution of copying behaviour
in P2P networks for diﬀerent individual characteristics. For a complete definition
of the variables refer to Table A1 in the appendix.
After deleting for missing values a sample of 2068 individuals is used for the
descriptive analysis. The first row of numbers in Table 1 shows the distribution of
total sample into P2P non-participants and participants (further into free-rider and
contributor). There are 48.6% individuals who do not participate in P2P networks,
28.82% who free-ride, and 22.58% who contribute to P2P networks.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
        P2P participants Total
Non-participants Free-ride Contribute (N=2068)
Percentage
All 48.60 28.82 22.58 100.00
Gender
Female 11.32 3.97 3.58 18.87
Age
age <= 24 yrs 5.32 4.93 3.87 14.12
25 yrs <= age <= 40 yrs 23.26 15.33 12.67 51.26
age > 40 yrs 20.02 8.56 6.04 34.62
Education
less than BAC 4.11 2.85 2.90 9.86
BAC/BAC Pro 7.01 5.08 3.92 16.01
BAC+1+2 12.81 8.61 5.27 26.69
BAC+3+4 10.49 6.09 4.26 20.84
more than BAC+5 14.17 6.19 6.24 26.60
Occupatio n
Freelance 18.28 9.43 7.83 35.54
Intermediate o ccupations 17.36 12.09 9.04 38.49
Retired 3.48 1.74 0.92 6.14
Student 2.85 2.22 1.84 6.91
Unemployed 6.62 3.34 2.95 12.91
Monthly household income
less than 1000 euro 5.08 3.63 2.47 11.17
b/w 1000 and 1500 euro 7.50 5.03 4.88 17.41
b/w 1500 and 2000 euro 8.27 4.84 4.01 17.12
b/w 2000 and 2500 euro 7.50 4.35 2.85 14.70
b/w 2500 and 3000 euro 6.67 3.48 3.48 13.64
b/w 3000 and 3500 euro 3.82 3.05 1.35 8.22
b/w 3500 and 4000 euro 3.53 1.98 1.31 6.82
b/w 4000 and 5000 euro 3.29 1.50 1.06 5.85
more than 500 0 euro 2.95 0.97 1.16 5.08
Herding
none 7.06 2.22 1.55 10.83
b/w 1 to 5 15.76 6.72 3.97 26.45
b/w 6 to 15 9.48 6.38 5.56 21.42
more than 15 16.30 13.49 11.51 41.30
Cultural diversity 15.14 12.77 11.51 39.41
Experience with internet
less than 1 year 6.82 3.38 1.79 11.99
b/w 1 to 2 years 10.25 4.40 3.00 17.65
b/w 2 to 3 years 13.01 8.46 6.62 28.09
more than 3 years 18.52 12.57 11.17 42.26
Mean value
Ethics 6.52 5.81 5.64 6.11
Willingn ess to pay 5.94 6.49 5.84 6.08
Legal risk 1.62 1.67 1.68 1.65
Technical  risk 1.67 1.54 1.53 1.60
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Going down the list of variables in Table 1 we observe that there are around
19% of females in the sample. For females the distribution of participation and
sharing behaviour is the following: 11% “Non-participant”, 4% “Free-ride” and 4%
“Contribute”. Deducting these percentages from full sample distribution of shar-
ing behaviour we find that among the male individuals 37% are “Non-participant”,
25% “Free-ride” and 19% “Contribute”. Dividing the percentage of diﬀerent shar-
ing behaviour by the total percentage we obtain the proportions of a group in
diﬀerent behavioural types. In terms of proportion, females are more likely to be
non-participants than are males, and males are more likely to be free-riders and
contributors to P2P than are females.
The table also shows that there is considerable variation in the data and in
sharing behaviour in terms of age, education and occupation of the individuals.
A careful reading of the numbers reveals that, in terms of percentage, the higher
is the age the higher is non-participation, and the lower is the age the higher is
the participation (both free-riding and contribution). The distribution in terms of
education shows that the higher is the education the higher is “Non-participant”.
For the lowest and highest categories of education “Contribute” is slightly higher
than “Free-ride”, but for other (middle) educational groups “Free-ride” is higher
than “Contribute”. For all the occupational groups the most prevalent behaviour
is “Non-participant”, followed by, in the order of less prevalence, the behavioural
types “Free-ride” and “Contribute”.
We also have considerable variation in terms of household income of the indi-
viduals. The pattern that emerges from the distribution of sharing behaviour for
diﬀerent household income categories is that the higher is the household income
the higher is “Non-participant” and the lower is the household income the higher
is participation (both “Free-ride” and “Contribute”). The distribution of copying
behaviour in terms of herding shows that the higher is the number of copiers in
a social neighbourhood the higher is the likelihood of participation (both “Free-
ride” and “Contribute”), and vice versa. There are 39% of individuals who think
that the legal market does not provide enough variety. However, 38% of them do
not participate in P2P networks, 32% “Free-ride” and 29% “Contribute” to P2P
networks.
Internet experience seems to be positively associated with participation in P2P
networks. The full sample average value of the variable of ethical concern is 6.11.
It is interesting to see that the average value is higher for non-participants and
that there is little diﬀerence between the average values of two types — “Free-ride”
and “Contribute”. For willingness to pay, surprisingly we find that the type “Free-
ride” has the highest willingness to pay of all types. As one might expect, we find
that participants (both “Free-ride” and “Contribute”) perceive higher legal risk
than non-participants. However, it is interesting to see that the individuals who
participate (type “Free-ride” and “Contribute”) perceive a lower technical risk than
the non-participants.
4.2. Econometric results. In this subsection, we present our estimation results.
The estimation is done for the P2P participants. The estimation sample consists of
1063 individuals who participate in P2P network. The probit estimates correspond
to the probability of contribution to P2P networks taking free-riding as the reference
group. Here we present the ‘marginal eﬀect’ of independent variables which is
interpreted as the eﬀect of a variable on the probability of contribution to P2P
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networks. The coeﬃcient estimates are reported in Table A2 in the appendix. Table
2 gives the marginal eﬀect from the estimation of contribution behaviour in P2P
networks. The estimation model incorporates the variables that have theoretical
relevance, demographics and Internet skills.
Table 2: Estimates of contribution behaviour in P2P network (marginal eﬀect)
  Marginal e ffect S. E
Gender
Female 0.051 0.048
Age
25  yrs  <= age <= 40 yrs 0.019 0.054
age > 40 yrs 0.038 0.063
Educa tio n
BAC/BAC Pro -0.058 0.059
BAC+1+2 -0.135 *** 0.054
BAC+3+4 -0.104 * 0.058
mo re than BAC+5 -0.018 0.062
Occu pat ion
Freelance -0.019 0.058
Intermediate occup at ions -0.038 0.055
Retired -0.099 0.085
Stud en t 0.003 0.083
Monthly househo ld income
b/w 1000  and 15 00 euro 0.109 * 0.061
b/w 1500  and 20 00 euro 0.059 0.064
b/w 2000  and 25 00 euro -0.005 0.067
b/w 2500  and 30 00 euro 0.110 0.068
b/w 3000  and 35 00 euro -0.094 0.074
b/w 3500  and 40 00 euro 0.025 0.082
b/w 4000  and 50 00 euro 0.010 0.089
mo re than 50 00 euro 0.134 0.094
Herding
b/w 1 to  5 -0.021 0.068
b/w 6 to  15 0.068 0.068
mo re than 15 0.056 0.065
Cultural  diversi ty 0.061 ** 0.032
Experience with internet
b/w 1 to  2 years 0.070 0.066
b/w 2 to  3 years 0.106 * 0.060
mo re than 3 years 0.132 ** 0.059
Ethics -0.005 0.008
Willin gness to pay -0.005 * 0.002
Legal risk 0.002 0.018
Tech nical risk 0.011 0.016
Number of observatio ns
Log likelihoo d
Notes:
*, ** and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
1063
-703.74
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Our main results are the following:
(1) The value of P2P networks is marginally significant. However, the marginal
eﬀect is negative and very low.
(2) The quest for cultural diversity makes individuals more likely to be a con-
tributor than a free-rider in P2P networks.
(3) The perception of legal and technical risks associated with sharing behav-
iour has no significant eﬀect on contribution.
(4) A moderate level of education is associated with a lower likelihood of being
a contributor in P2P.
(5) Age, income and occupation do not have a significant impact on behaviour
in P2P networks.
(6) Higher internet experience has significant positive impact on contribution
behaviour.
These results are summarized in the following table:
Table 3: Eﬀects on contribution behaviour
Favourable eﬀects Unfavourable eﬀects Neutral eﬀects
Cultural diversity Willingness to pay Legal and technical
risks
Internet experience Moderate level of edu-
cation
Social status (income,
occupation)
According to results 1, 2, and 3, factors likely to influence utilitarian decision-
making have no impact, except for the quest for cultural diversity. The economic
value of the service associated with P2P networks (the provision of contents in
a sharing network) does not matter. Rather, people contribute to enhance the
diversity of contents. In doing so, they can follow a principle of general reciprocity
by expecting the same behaviour from the set of other peers participating to the
networks. Or they are guided by purely altruistic motivations by feeling that the
cultural diversity prevailing in the legal market is insuﬃcient and contribution in
alternative networks can compensate this lack.
The second set of results (4, 5 and 6) suggests that social status variables (age,
income and occupation) do not explain sharing behaviour. By contrast, a moderate
level of education has a significant eﬀect. This result is consistent with the socioe-
conomic literature about cultural practices (see Seaman, 2006). Finally, the higher
is the experience with Internet the higher is the probability that an individual
contributes to P2P networks.
5. Conclusion
Explaining why people contribute to P2P networks is crucial to the understand-
ing how these sharing networks actually work and, above all, the conditions of
their (non)viability. Indeed, the availability of files and diversity on P2P networks
depend strictly on the willingness of some peers to upload copies. Our economet-
ric results suggest that the motivations for contributing are poorly determined by
rational self-interested behaviour.
A major way to fight against P2P networks is to try to influence the utility they
generate for participants. One such strategy can consist in reducing their absolute
utility by increasing the costs associated with contribution in order to dry up the
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supply of contents on P2P networks. But our findings suggest that this strategy
might be ineﬃcient. Our results are sharply in contrast to the assertion of Krishnan
et al. (2004) that “increasing the cost of sharing can reduce the number of sharers
and above a certain point lead to network collapse [...]. Increasing the implicit cost
of sharing is by increasing the legal risks to individual network users from sharing
copyrighted information.”19 In fact, our findings suggest the opposite: copyright en-
forcement (in particular, increased sanctions, legal suits against individual copiers)
has no impact on contribution behaviour. This might explain the failure of current
enforcement strategies.
In particular, our findings cast some doubts on the eﬃciency of the recent bill of
the French government aiming at putting an end to unauthorized P2P file-sharing.
The ‘réponse graduée’ consists of, firstly, sending a warning by email to the copy-
right infringers who upload content on P2P networks; then — if the P2P user keeps
on uploading — sending a warning by registered mail; and finally — if the infringer
continues uploading — imposing a fine on her. At best, this new form of copyright
enforcement could eliminate the current P2P technology used to share contents.
But, according to our results, any new sharing technology that would replace cur-
rent P2P technology might be fuelled by the ‘supply’ of contents contributors.
Another strategy is to decrease the relative utility of P2P networks by increasing
the quality of services and diversity of contents available in the legal markets. Con-
tent industries should try to build innovative business models to compete eﬃciently
with P2P content-sharing or even to extract the value from these sharing communi-
ties (Le Guel and Rochelandet, 2006). Copyright law could stimulate innovation by
implementing compulsory licences in order to facilitate the acquisition of copyrights
and increase the size of catalogue supplied to consumers on legal markets.
Finally, our paper suggests that contribution behaviour is not well explained by
an utilitarian approach. In contrast, it can be motivated by social influence. In
particular, these practices are embedded in a social context. A further step will
then consist in exploring the mechanisms by which this social influence explains the
behaviour of contributors over P2P networks.
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Appendix
Table A1: Definition of Variables
Variable Definition
P2P
Non-participant equals 1 if the individual does not exchange
contents in P2P networks, 0 otherwise
Free Ride equals 1 if the individual receives content from
P2P networks but does not provide, 0 other-
wise
Contribute equals 1 if the individual contributes content
to P2P networks, 0 otherwise
Gender equals 1 if female, 0 otherwise
Age
age ≤24 years equals 1 if the individual is less than 25 years
old, 0 otherwise
25≤age≤40 equals 1 if the individual is aged between 25
and 40, 0 otherwise
age>40 equals 1 if the individual is more than 40 years
old, 0 otherwise
Education
less than BAC less than BAC/BAC Pro
BAC/BAC Pro high school graduate, business, technical
BAC+1+2 some college (not 4 year degree)
BAC+3+4 BS or more
more than BAC+5 MA
Occupation Options: Freelance (executive), intermediate
occupations (skilled and unskilled workers),
retired, student, and unemployed
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Table A1 (cont.): Definition of Variables
Variable Definition
Monthly household income Options: less than 1000 euros per month,
between 1000 and 1500 euros per month,
between 1500 and 2000 euros per month,
between 2000 and 2500 euros per month,
between 2500 and 3000 euros per month,
between 3000 and 3500 euros per month,
between 3500 and 4000 euros per month,
between 4000 and 5000 euros per month,
over 5000 euros per month
Hearding Number of copiers in neighbourhood. Op-
tions: none, between 1 and 5, between 6
and 15, more than 15
Cultural diversity Do you think the legal market for music
does not oﬀer enough variety? 1 for agree
and completely agree, 0 otherwise
Experience with internet Options: less than 1 year, between 1 and
2 years, between 2 and 3 years, and more
than 3 years.
Ethics An index of ethical concerns. It is the sum
of four coded aspects: copying (i) threatens
the existence of the market for music and
CDs, (ii) threatens the income of artists
and others involved, (iii) does not respect
the work of the artists and others involved,
and (iv) is bad in general. Coding: 1 for
‘do not agree’, 2 for ‘partially agree’, 3 for
‘agree’, and 4 for ‘strongly agree’.
Willingness to pay Willingness to pay for a P2P network that
gives unlimited access to music (in Euros).
Legal risk Perceived legal risk of being caught copy-
ing: 0 for ‘no risk’, 1 for ‘low risk’, 2 for
‘medium risk’, and 3 for ‘high risk’
Technical risk Perceived legal risk of contamination by
virus or spyware: 0 for ‘no risk’, 1 for ‘low
risk’, 2 for ‘medium risk’, and 3 for ‘high
risk’
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Table A2: Estimates of contribution behaviour in P2P network (Coeﬃcient)
  Coeffcient S. E.
Gender
Female 0.129 0.121
Age
25 yrs  <= age <= 40  yrs 0.048 0.136
age > 4 0 yrs 0.097 0.160
Edu cation
BAC/BAC Pro -0.148 0.153
BAC+1+2 -0.350 ** 0.143
BAC+3+4 -0.269 * 0.154
mo re th an  BAC+5 -0.046 0.159
Occu pation
Freelance -0.048 0.148
Intermediate occupations -0.097 0.139
Ret ired -0.258 0.231
Student 0.008 0.211
Monthly hou sehold  income
b/w 1000 and  150 0 euro 0.274 * 0.154
b/w 1500 and  200 0 euro 0.149 0.160
b/w 2000 and  250 0 euro -0.013 0.170
b/w 2500 and  300 0 euro 0.277 0.171
b/w 3000 and  350 0 euro -0.244 0.197
b/w 3500 and  400 0 euro 0.064 0.207
b/w 4000 and  500 0 euro 0.024 0.226
mo re th an  5000  eu ro 0.337 0.240
Herdin g
b/w 1 to 5 -0.054 0.174
b/w 6 to 15 0.171 0.172
mo re th an  15 0.141 0.166
Cultu ral diversity 0.156 ** 0.080
Experience with internet
b/w 1 to 2 years 0.178 0.166
b/w 2 to 3 years 0.269 * 0.151
mo re th an  3 years 0.337 ** 0.152
Eth ics -0.014 0.020
Willingn ess to pay -0.012 * 0.006
Legal  risk 0.004 0.045
Tech nical  risk 0.028 0.041
Constant -0.420 0.315
Number o f o bservations
Log l ikelihood
Notes:
1063
-703.74
*, ** and *** stand for si gnif icance a t 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respec tively.
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